Major Successes
Internalizing externalized material recovery benefits and disposal costs

While this may sound boring, it is probably RAM's most important, long-lasting, and far-reaching achievement. Parts of it extend back before RAM formed, and parts played major underlying roles in success numbers 4, 7, 19-21, and 23 on the preceding Brief History and Longer History pages, and what is on the subsequent Current Campaigns page.

Acquaintance with the concept for this -- and the application of it -- came as a result of John van der Harst doing work for the Institute for Self-Reliance (ILSR), in Washington, DC. -- which was at that time (early 1992) looked to for guidance nationally on the waste topic. This concept was needed to prove what John was hired to do.

ILSR had not done this previously, referring to such costs and benefits as supplemental to the material recovery vs. disposal topic. John recommended that ILSR upgrade its economic analysis approach. ILSR felt that would make their previous work -- which they made money selling -- seem obsolete. ILSR not only chose to continue with their previous economically incorrectly-modelled valuations, but altered their contract's scope of work -- physically crossing out part of it -- to preclude John from using this on their project thereafter. Further, ILSR refused to pay John for half of his previous work. John left in disgust. What a calcified, talent-wasting outfit! Not true to their PR. Thieves and frauds.

Back in Nashville, while planning for the second wet/dry pilot, John was ambushed by four lumber-and-baseball bat-wielding thugs, after being warned by a national disposal company manager that something might happen if he did not back off from his activism. John was badly injured, but survived. Broken nose. Sight lost in one eye, which fortunately later returned. Dental damage to a set of 32 teeth without a single filling in any of them. Every bit of strength and flexibility paid off. The connection seemed very obvious. John's previous group did not offer what he felt was the necessary preventative action called for, to protect their primary researcher. With this added to a long history of mismanagement in that group, John left.

The attack confirmed the effectiveness of his work exposing sham recycling promoted by the disposal industry to preserve their disposal business.

Later, John found out from a lobbyist that the waste company manager subsequently was promoted.

After two traumatic leavings within a few months of each other, John seriously evaluated other affiliation options. All other groups would not allow John to upgrade their previous ineffective agendas. So John did what he had never aimed to do before. He conceived and organized RAM. That took a lot of time and effort. Often, tough choices faced criticism no matter what direction was chosen.

After producing RAM's first newsletter, John applied economic internalization to incinerator expansion in Nashville -- for a facility which then touted the best economic performance of any incinerator in the U.S., with its triple revenue stream. After completing a 5-scenario comparative analysis, John became the only person in Davidson County calling for shutting down the incinerator. He then used his analysis for over 9 years, as the foundation for an ultimately successful campaign. A powerful tool indeed!

First state soil-based compost quality standards as an incentive class

This campaign battled what was then becoming a nationwide wave of facilities producing bad quality composts, which threatened the image and popularity of composting. RAM's John van der Harst and Sandy Loyd had seen plenty of bad-quality composts being produced at facilities they had toured on their travels together. John had collected, kept, and labeled samples of these in glass jars.

In addition to what has been described on the Brief History and Longer History pages in item 6 (which is not being repeated here), it can not be overstated how much science and health risk assessment needed to be studied in order to successfully complete the regulatory establishment process. Also, communicating those complexities so that a wide variety of citizens could make sense of them was important. Two rounds of commenting took a lot of time.

A brief primer: For heavy metal levels, soil-based standards are typically derived by multiplying levels found in typical soils by 10, and then modifying from there based on any good science that becomes available. The 40 CFR (Code of Federal Register) Part 503 numbers come from health risk assessment, presenting a limited set of hypothetical scenarios as models, in isolation, in which assumptions are made as to what uptake by life should be expected, and the effect of that. Thresholds are used which assume no life is otherwise or previously impacted (as many children are, with lead -- they have already surpassed their thresholds).

Advocates for these find comfort in NAEOL (No Adverse Effects Observed Levels) numbers that are higher -- but again, in order to get numbers, these came from artificial, controlled conditions . Once critics find effects at lower levels, as they have for cadmium, for example, trust in the whole set goes out the window.

Mistrust also stems from conflict-of-interest, as the risk assessment was influenced heavily by sewage sludge producers who had enormous levels of heavy metals in material that they were wanting others to accept. On the plus side, compost added to soils low in organics -- as many are, unfortunately, after years of tilling and erosion -- generally lowers heavy metal uptake by edible life. Exceptions exist, like fungi, which tend to absorb mercury readily. But who eats mushrooms?

The lower-quality advocates in government/industry eventually paid for Rufus Cheney, of USDA, to address the board. A composting advocate had commented how ambitious Rufus seemed to be, as an amazingly prolific author. Discussion before the meeting evoked no passion. No ambition was obvious. Rather, he seemed like the type who would allow his name to be put on anything industry wrote. Rufus' address to the board was unremarkable. The board -- with only one seat held by a representative of the environmental community -- still seemed to have at least respect for those calling for higher standards -- more than when this process began.

First voluntary closure of a large, financially-viable, WTE incinerator with up-to-date air pollution control equipment

Some more details not found on the Brief History and Longer History pages, item 7: When first proposed, the Staff Attorney for the 40-member Metropolitan Council of Nashville and Davidson County publicly lectured against anyone who would propose such a supposedly impossible thing. The non-profit Nashville Thermal Transfer Corp. (NTTC) board included business and state and local government-appointees. Chilled water was its biggest commodity, followed by steam and electricity. It heated and cooled most of downtown Nashville. Avoidance of financing and maintaining separate HVAC equipment helped spur downtown development. Providing revenue bond financing for expansion of NTTC in 1983 had received a unanimous Council vote. American Ash Recycling Corp. (AAR), after late 1993, assured Metro that no more ash landfill expansion would ever be required.

When incineration was proposed in Oakland County, Michigan, NTTC was used as the example to look at. Its economics were the best in the industry.

Amid a massive search for a new local landfill, recycling became a topic, but mostly, city leaders backed expansion of incineration. Both at NTTC, and two separate additional ones.

One by one, expansion plans were thwarted. Barely. But expansion still had a lot of support.

Then, in front of this expansion backdrop, picture RAM coming out with a plan to close the incinerator. What?? Nobody saw that coming. Not even the other recycling, solid waste, and anti-incinerator advocacy groups.

A multi-pronged campaign ensued which accumulated enough support for closure that Metro Council leadership (the Chair -- the Vice Mayor -- following the pro-incinerator Mayor), 3 years later, allowed an incinerator lobbyist to work the Council ahead of the required air pollution control equipment upgrade vote, one-by-one, in committee rooms, while citizens watched from outside locked, glass doors. RAM had also tried to achieve tighter standards than the USEPA allowed. Many pages of comments.

After a slim majority vote to upgrade NTTC's APC equipment, to allow it to keep going past 2000, the mayor's arrogant chief policy guru berated RAM's John van der Harst in front of Council members. "Get a life," he loudy exclaimed, "Thermal is here to stay... It will never be shut down." No one there came to John's defense.

One meeting later, an emboldened AAR sued RAM and John, separately, claiming tortious interference with legitimate business interests. Papers were served at the Council meeting. Carl Evertson was there. He and John headed straight over to the newspapers' offices. Carl and others had let John do the heavy lifting on that issue previously. Hence a convenient, simple, isolated SLAPP target.

After 3 1/4 years were taken out of John's and much of Carl's, Sherry Sloan's and others' lives, amid multiple legal filings, final papers were mailed from the airport, as John raced to his mother's deathbed. She never was able to learn that John was finally free from his legal ordeal. John's new mess was 8 months dealing with a packed house and family. Wide distribution. Lots of recycling.

5 years after John was berated over a seemingly impossible outcome, Metro Council voted to close NTTC. AAR's contract was ended. Temporary gas boilers used to transition to the planned new District Energy System were almost completely installed when a huge tipping floor fire caused Metro to cease operations at that point. One long rushed weekend, plus one business day, were all buildings had to endure lower HVAC function.

A few months after NTTC closed, John noticed other distance runners besides himself for the first time in East Nashville. And bicyclists. Previously few of those ventured there, downwind of Thermal. East Nashville had been a lower-income part of town. Hence John living there. Runners and cyclists typically represent higher income demographics. Sure enough, gentrification then took off. 6 years after Thermal's closure, the East Nasty Running Club formed there (name paying homage to the former long-term vibe), and grew to become the biggest running club in the region. Half the runners would come there from other parts of town, and as far away as Nolensville and Culleoka. His East Nasty of the Week bio called John "the original East Nasty."

Ascend Amphitheater now stands where NTTC once did. Musicians perform where once the Walking Incinerator and Walking Ashfill used to -- dripping imitation quench water and leachate in their paths. Was RAM street theater higher in quality? It evoked far more intense emotion. It got good things done.

No more treated incinerator ash outside landfills

What was included on the preceding Brief History and Longer History pages, item 8, left out a lot of detail. Not all of the remainder will be covered here either. It's too long. What's important to know is 1) the nature of incinerator ash, and 2) what treating it can lead to.

  1. Solid waste is burned to reduce volume. While landfilling reduces waste volume by about 50%, via compaction, and balefilling by about 60%, burning reduces it by 85-90%. Some, but not a lot, more. Burning waste reduces its weight by less -- only 60-75% -- because revenues are maximized by higher and constant rate throughputs, which leaves a lot of the very-heterogeneous waste unburned.

    Incineration creates a time-varying toxic and reactive, corrosive, chemical mix. Only a few of the vast chemical set created are regulated. Scrubbing more from smokestack emissions puts more toxins into the ash. When visiting the ash landfill where American Ash Recycling Corp. of TN (AAR) was digging into it for their feedstock, the smell, and accompanying insects, indicated a lot of raw, rotting waste.

  2. AAR did a laudable job of recovering pieces of metal from ash, to be recycled. However, it also paid to use a patented process to spray a phosphoric acid solution on the rest (decreasing lead's solubility, but increasing other heavy metals' like mercury), call it treated, and transport it to construction sites for use as a loose fill material. It was not supposed to remain surface-exposed (1,800 ppm lead [EPA considers 400 hazardous]), but in practice it was. A lot. This visibly violated AAR's state permit, which was based upon modelling in a health risk assessment (HRA) AAR submitted. Complaints were dismissed. Then, same for complaints with photos. Ditto with complaints with photos and translucent overlays with arrows.

    At some point, the HRA, purposely intimidatingly long, needed to be read, studied, and its flaws attacked. Modelling, threshold, and toxicological assumptions ignored realities. Many substances in ash were omitted. Only then, the state brought in staff with HRA experience. They were less lazy. Less slow. They educated formerly clueless staff. Notices of Violation followed. AAR was shut down for a while. Reevaluation occurred. Limits were tightened. Finally TAA was only allowed on large sites which mimicked landfill conditions more. By that point, complaints filled one 2" ring binder plus one 1 1/2" ring binder.

As those notebooks filled, tough confrontations occurred. Sherry Sloan was cornered in a convenience store, and warned she could be shot if she continued. The store clerk denied witnessing this to police. John was ambushed by three thugs, after running almost 6 miles with copies. A passing driver stopped after seeing a fleeing John knocked to the ground. The thugs fled. He allowed John to get in the back of his truck, to escape. Only facial bruises and pulled forearm muscles this time. AAR employees confronted Steve Henry and John when they tried to visit. Steve drove a hasty retreat. An AAR employee employed tailgating road-rage tactics against Sherry Slone -- once alone, and once with John. Sherry was not tailgating when treated ash spilling/bouncing/blowing off a truck, and the roadway behind it (a common occurrence) cracked her windshield.

RAM tried to suggest ways for AAR to improve their product. A cordial meeting was facilitated by Metro. No deal. RAM persuaded Metro to separate fly and bottom ash, only allowing AAR to access bottom ash. NTTC and AAR agreed. Finally, closure of NTTC cut off AAR's supply. Metro ended AAR's contract after the Council vote, and negotiated a low purchase price for their building. AAR continued to show a photo of their former processing facility on their website, implying it still operated. This self-inflicted dishonesty caused other environmental groups to ask RAM about it. That hurt AAR's reputation even further.

The lawsuits filed by AAR and its affiliates came amid the regulatory drama. Initial, clueless state staff's negligence enabled lax permits, hid violations, and denied enforcement. One put that ignorance in writing. A single I-don't-see-anything letter. That emboldened AAR to get careless, and employ classic SLAPP lawsuit tactics when facing a single, poor, but extremely effective opponent. Tennessee was one of 3 states with a Chancery Court (Delaware and Louisiana are the others), designed to streamline business dispute resolution. This case was assigned to a Republican-appointed Chancellor not inclined to believe businesses would sue frivolously.

A kind-but-very-direct, environmentally-experienced attorney suggested by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Mary Parker, brought realism to bear, amid limited options, including no prospect of significant money. She advocated trying to end this the quickest way possible, using First Amendment grounds. A drawback was, this would allow AAR to hammer RAM and John publicly on the issue, making it look like he was hiding behind free-speech laws. If John talked too much about the issue, that risked this becoming a dispute over the issue -- far more complex, and costly, legally.

John put all of the responsibility on himself, to spare other RAM personnel. AAR accepted that, gaining the image of its opponent appearing smaller.

Mary recruited help from attorney Stacy Gibson, an associate she knew was interested in First Amendment issues. John talked with an expert on SLAPPs at the University of Denver. Carl Evertson purchased his book, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out, by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, Temple University Press. A must-read on this topic. Stacy left that book fringed with post-it strips. Its legal citations saved a lot of time.

At the first hearing, Mary was able to show enough photos to establish need, an important component of the malice-standard checklist. Chancellor Lyle -- thorough, but lacking evidence -- ruled against AAR, but then suggested how they might be able to proceed successfully, and allowed them to conduct discovery on John. One-sided. More time consumed -- one of the very purposes of filing SLAPP suits.

Along the way, a long-time self-promoter filed a Friend-of-the-Court Brief, representing himself in court. Chancellor Lyle questioned his purpose, clearly intending to dismiss it. Mary kindly proposed a solution: This could be registered as a demonstration of external support. More time consumed. But also another newspaper article. Mary and Stacy ended up getting paid mostly with publicity. Plus compliments, and who they came from. The courtroom gallery, aside from AAR reps, contained John's supporters. Some money came from fundraising Sandy Hepler organized. Others chipped in as well. Some quite generously. The compliments seemed to matter most. Both Mary and Stacy, afterward, both had long and successful careers. Mary's bio is in several Marquis Who's Who reference books, as is John's.

Chancellor Lyle eventually ruled against AAR, with prejudice, meaning AAR could not appeal further. She still refused to call it a SLAPP suit, nullifying the use of a state SLAPP suit law passed amid this lawsuit and its publicity. John sued back for damages. AAR hired another attorney, who filed another lawsuit, in federal court. This focused on McDonald's reversal on prior use of AAR's product. Discovery proceeded. Mary and John visited corporate attorney Joe Prochaska to hear about possible court action risks, including a judge mistakenly issuing an opinion on the issue itself that might be underinformed. AAR's new attorney, reading the sheer enormity of documentation against AAR's product at this point, offered to drop their lawsuit if John would drop his. Mary and Joe drew up the paperwork, and John, racing to his dying mother's bedside in Michigan, mailed it in from the airport. That was a significant factor in the settlement decision. All activists have personal lives. Not just those carrying light loads.

More detailed accounts of RAM's successes on this issue in other states, plus another success related to it, remain under development. RAM is proud of these. But, they are lengthy. And complicated. RAM prefers to concentrate its time, now, more on preventing the need for disposal to begin with.

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